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Abstract
We introduce social interactions into the Schelling model of resi-
dential choice. These social interactions take the form of a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game played with neighbors. First, we study the Schelling
model over a wide range of utility functions and then proceed to study
a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma model. These models provide a bench-
mark for studying a combined model with preferences over like-typed
neighbors and payoﬀs in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We
study this combined model both analytically and using agent-based
simulations. We ﬁnd that the presence of these additional social inter-
actions may increase or decrease segregation compared to the standard
Schelling model. If the social interactions result in cooperation then
segregation is reduced, otherwise it is increased.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C63, C73, D62
Key words: Schelling Tipping Model, Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Cooperation, Segregation
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11 Introduction
Racial and ethnic segregation in the United States continues to be common,
despite survey results that show people to be increasingly opposed to the
idea of racial segregation (Sethi and Somanathan, 2004).
One of the most compelling accounts of why segregation is still so wide-
spread was provided by Schelling (1969, 1971). His model, seen as a fore-
runner of the current agent-based modeling paradigm in economics, shows
how even a relatively small preference for neighbors of one’s own “type” can
lead to neighborhood tipping and a high level of segregation. Schelling’s re-
sults may be considered quite pessimistic if one views segregation as a bad
outcome.
While many agents, individually, may prefer living in majority-type neigh-
borhoods for cultural or, sometimes, language-based reasons, segregation is
considered a bad outcome because of the external eﬀects that it can have on
the society as a whole. For instance, it is commonly argued that racial segre-
gation, especially when mixed with income inequality, may lead to unequal
education and employment opportunities, the persistence of existing levels
of income and wealth inequality, and poverty traps. As Cutler and Glaeser
(1997) demonstrate, Blacks living in urban ghettos have reduced social and
economics outcomes, such as high school graduation rates, labor market earn-
ings and a higher prevalence of single motherhood rates. In general, severe
segregation is associated with lower social well being.
Clearly people choose neighborhoods for many reasons beyond the racial
and ethnic composition. In general, people weigh type-based preferences
along with other location-based characteristics, such as the quality of the
public schools, and the types of nearby stores. In addition, the utility derived
from living in a speciﬁc neighborhood or community can be determined, in
part, by the degree to which residents have positive interactions with their
neighbors.
In this paper, we consider an extension of the Schelling model by also
having agents play a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with their neigh-
bors. In short, agents will determine their location choice by the outcome
of both the Schelling and Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Our interest here is in
expanding the Schelling model to include other features beyond type-based
preferences that can determine the residents’ quality of life. People’s utility
derived from their residential choice is determined, in part, by the actions of
their neighbors. In many cases, the actions of residents and their neighbors is
2endogenous. One example is that of property maintenance. As Robert Frost
has written, “good fences make good neighbors”: if one neighbor does not
contribute to the maintenance of a common fence, it will reduce the incentive
of the other to maintain it as well.1 Another example is parental involvement
i nt h ep u b l i cs c h o o l s .T h em o r ep a r e n t sa r ei n v o l v e d ,t h em o r ei tw i l lc o n f e ra
positive beneﬁt upon everyone in the school: increased student performance,
a better sense of community, etc.
Social psychologists have documented a relationship between residents’
sense of community, “neighboring” and personal well-being. Sense of community—
a psychological perception of how well neighbors get along—has been found
to be associated with a greater sense of personal well-being (Farrell, et al.,
2004). Neighboring is the exchange of goods and services among neighbors,
such as the giving of information about good plumbers, the lending of power
tools, or the provision of aid in an emergency. The willingness of neighbors
to engage in these trades can directly inﬂuence residents, as the standard
gains-from-trade models show, but can also improve the sense of community
and, therefore, well-being (Farrell, et al., 2004).
Demographers have investigated the degree to which peoples’ perceptions
about the quality of their neighborhood aﬀect both their desire to move and
their actual movement behavior. For example, Clark and Ledwith (2005) an-
alyze a sample of households in Los Angeles, who were surveyed, among other
things, about whether they perceived their neighborhoods as being close-knit
or not, and whether they were dissatisﬁed with their current neighborhood.
The authors found that holding constant other determinants of the desire to
move, respondents who said they lived in communities that were not closely-
knit were more likely to say that they desired to move.
Lee et al. (1994), found that the rate of neighborhood turnover increased
peoples’ desire to move. Turnover is clearly one measure of the degree to
which people engage in neighborhood trade, under the assumption that the
more turnover the less interaction among neighbors. Clearly the decision to
move is not the same thing as the desire to move, but the desire to move
is an important determinant of movement behavior, and the desire to move
can be an indicator of the willingness to engage in neighboring.2 Thus one
1Another interpretation of Frost’s line is that residents prefer privacy or clear boundary
demarcations over social interaction with their neighbors. However, the issue of taste for
privacy in not included in the model.
2Lee, et al. (1994), for example, found in their sample that of the residents who did
not consider moving, only 13.1% actually did so within a year; while 32.9% of those who
3can envision an endogenous relationship between neighboring and mobility.
Recent research in economics and sociology has investigated the eﬀect
of social capital and trust on agent behavior (Glaeser, et al., 2000). At
the country level, greater degrees of trust among citizens has been found to
increase economic growth and to decrease corruption. As well, research ﬁnd-
ings suggest that dense social networks can sustain trust; while interactions
between diﬀerent racial groups are often characterized by lower degrees of
trust (Glaeser, et al., 2000).3 Marshall and Stolle (2004) found, in a sam-
ple of neighborhoods in the Detroit area, that there is a strong relationship
between race and feelings of trust (holding income constant). They found,
for example, that “neighborhood racial heterogeneity and neighborhood so-
ciability signiﬁcantly increase blacks’ propensity to trust others” (p. 145).
However, interestingly this ﬁnding did not hold for whites in the sample; het-
erogeneity appeared to increase feelings of distrust for whites. These ﬁndings
are clearly complicated by the fact that interactions occur within the con-
text of minority-majority relationships. However, the important point for
this paper is that social interactions can foster trust, and that these social
interactions can and do take place among agents of diﬀerent races or ethnic-
ities.
It is within this context that we introduce the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
into the Schelling model. Schelling’s original model was designed to show
how, even with strong preferences for integration, segregation was the only
stable equilibrium. Our aim is to demonstrate that by introducing a model
where cooperation (and therefore trust) among agents can develop, integrated
neighborhoods can be an obtainable and stable equilibrium.
As many models have shown (discussed below), cooperation can be a sus-
tainable outcome in a Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma framework under some
conditions. We view the emergence of cooperation here as the development
of neighborhood trust and, also by extension, as the gains that are available
to neighbors when they engage in neighboring, such as the loaning of power
tools, the provision of aid, and/or just being friendly (e.g., “I’ll wave to you
in the morning, if you wave to me”).4
did consider moving, actually did so.
3Clearly education levels of both people and the neighborhoods they live in can help
determine their trust levels, their attitudes toward other races, and their willingness to
engage in neighboring. Here we don’t explore the role of income or other class-related
variables.
4Frank (1999) also points out that consumption “arms races” among neighbors can
4The reason the Prisoner’s Dilemma can be important within the Schelling
game is that cooperation can potentially oﬀset the loss of utility that neigh-
bors receive when they live with neighbors of a diﬀerent type. Our aim is to
investigate under what conditions this can hold, and to what degree can we
view segregation and cooperation as substitutes. That is to say, the emer-
gence of trust among neighbors can oﬀset or remove negative utility from
living with diﬀerent-type neighbors. To simplify matters, we model an equal
proportion of agent types, as well as an equal initial proportion of agents
who are “cooperators” and “defectors.” Certainly the interaction of agents
can be more complex when one group is a minority and the other is a major-
ity. Sociological research has found that Black and Whites in the U.S. have
diﬀerent attitudes toward both integration and toward trust of neighbors
(See Marshall and Stolle (2004) for example). We leave this complicating
variation of the model for future work.
We will show that low levels of segregation can be supported in our model
if high levels of cooperation can also be supported as an outcome of the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game. On the other hand, our model leads to even higher
levels of segregation than are produced in the Schelling model when all agents
defect is the outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Thus our model leads
to the conclusion that increasing social interactions can be helpful in reduc-
ing segregation if the process of interaction leads to cooperation. But, social
interactions should be limited if the interactions lead to non-cooperative out-
comes. To the best of our knowledge no other paper has explored the eﬀect
that neighborhood cooperation can have in aﬀecting the instability of inte-
gration in the Schelling model.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the related
literature. Then section 3 discusses the Schelling model with the inclusion
of a utility function for agents. Next, in section 4 we introduce the repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the probability rules agents use in choosing
whether to cooperate or not. Then, in section 5, we provide the model and
results of the combined Schelling and Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Finally,
section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
negatively impact personal feelings of well-being.
52 Related Literature
Schelling Models The Schelling model has become one of the central
models cited in the genesis of agent-based economics (see Pancs and Vriend,
2007). It is widely cited as a pedagogical tool partly for the simplicity of the
model and partly for the intrigue of the central result. Modest preferences for
living near one’s own type can lead to high levels of residential segregation.
This central result has been subjected to various robustness checks over the
years.
Most recently Pancs and Vriend (2007) subject the Schelling model to a
series of computational speciﬁcations (one dimension versus two dimensions,
line versus ring, checkerboard versus torus) and ﬁnd that the central segrega-
tion result does not depend strongly on any of these speciﬁcations. Further
they expand the range of preferences incorporated in the Schelling model.
In the original model, the preferences of Schelling’s agents were asymmetric;
agents were opposed to being a member of a small minority group in their
neighborhood but not to being a member of a large majority group. In short,
agents did not prefer segregation but they did not oppose it either as long as
they were in the majority.
Am a i nc o n t r i b u t i o no fP a n c sa n dV r i e n d( 2 0 0 7 )i si nt h e i re x p a n s i o no f
the utility functions considered in the Schelling model. Speciﬁcally, they re-
move the above-described asymmetry by considering a utility function where
agents prefer integration to both being in a neighborhood where they are a
small minority and being in a neighborhood where they are a large majority.
Agents have single peaked, tent shaped preferences where a 50-50 integrated
neighborhood is strictly preferred to all other neighborhood compositions
(even one with an agent’s neighborhood being composed exclusively of their
own type.) Somewhat amazingly, they ﬁnd that the Schelling model still
produces large amounts of residential segregation. In our model, we also will
investigate a large range of utility functions including a tent shaped function
where all agents prefer more integration to less.
Recently the Schelling model also has been subjected to more rigorous
analytical analysis from the perspective of evolutionary game theory (Zhang,
2004 and Dokumaci, 2006). This work attempts to understand the creation
of segregation in the Schelling model from a formal analytical perspective.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Studies of the maintenance of cooperation
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma are vast. Economists are long familiar with the
6“folk theorem” (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1996), which says that agents can
maintain cooperation in an inﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma as long as
t h ef u t u r ei sn o td i s c o u n t e dt o oh e a v i l y .
More recently, other means of maintaining cooperation in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma have been studied. Examples range to include reputation (Nowak
and Sigmund, 1998), reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984), the use of tags and signals
to recognize opponent types (Riolo, 1997; Riolo et al, 2001; Hales, 2001;
Janssen, 2007), and withdrawal from play (Aktipis, 2004; Janssen, 2007).
Most closely related to the implementation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in
our paper is the work on the maintenance of cooperation in spatial mod-
els (Nowak and May, 1992; Nowak, Bonhoeﬀer and May, 1994; Schweitzer,
Behera and Muhlenbein, 2002). In these models it is shown that repeated
interaction with local neighbors may lead to the evolution of cooperation in
a Prisoner’s Dilemma.5
These spatial models are especially pertinent for our purposes because the
Schelling model is clearly spatial as well. Therefore we have chosen to follow
this line of research to implement a model of the Prisoner’s Dilemma into
the Schelling model. Speciﬁc a l l y ,w eh a v ec h o s e nt h ef r a m e w o r ko fN o w a k ,
Bonhoeﬀer and May (2004) for our model. Agents in the traditional Schelling
model choose to move or stay based on agent types in a speciﬁed local neigh-
borhood. In our model agents also will consider a second element in their
utility function: the results of the outcomes in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game
w i t ht h o s ea g e n t sl o c a t e di nt h es a m es p e c i ﬁed neighborhood. We describe
our model in more detail in the sections below.
3 The Schelling Model with Utility
Our paper will consist of three models. The ﬁrst two will be stand-alone
versions of the Schelling Segregation model and an implementation of a
neighborhood-based Prisoner’s Dilemma model, similar to Nowak, Bonho-
eﬀer and May (1994). We present the results of these two models indepen-
dently in order to have a benchmark for comparison to our last model which
combines elements of both of the individual models.
In our ﬁrst experiment we implement the standard Schelling model with a
utility function. We have two types of agents. Each type of agent is diﬀerent
5The introduction to Schweitzer, Behera and Mühlenbein (2002) provides a nice
overview of the literature on cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
7in some recognizable way from the other type, and all else equal, each agent
has a utility function over the proportion of agents of the same type. We
assume here that all agents have the same utility function.
In our implementation we use a 12 × 12 grid with 14 spots (roughly
1 0 % )l e f te m p t y .6 5o ft h ea g e n t sa r eo n et y p e ,a n d6 5a r et h eo t h e r .E a c h
agent interacts with the agents within her “Moore” neighborhood; that is,
an agent’s neighborhood consists of the eight surrounding agents. If an agent
is in a corner or on an edge, then the agent will have fewer neighbors. The
lattice is not a “wrapped” around torus. We make this assumption because
we believe this is a more accurate model of the geographic/spatial patterns
observed in physical residential neighborhoods.6
An agent’s utility is determined based on the proportion of neighbors that
are of the same type. The function is given by
u(s)=
½
α +2( β − α)s if s<0.5
[β + γ (β − α)] − γ2(β − α)s,
¾
,
where s ∈ [0,1] is the proportion of neighbors that are the same as the
agent. γ ∈ [0,1] is our measure of the agents’ preference for integration. This
utility function is rising from 0 to 0.5 and peaks at 0.5 before decreasing. γ
determines the degree of “steepness” of the negatively-sloped portion of the
utility function.
Figure 1 presents a graph of the utility functions for diﬀerent values of
γ. When γ =0 , agent’s utilities are rising from s =0to s =0 .5, after that
point, agents are indiﬀerent between being barely in the majority and having
all neighbors of the same type. If γ ∈ (0,1], then agents globally prefer to
be in a neighborhood in which exactly half of their neighbors are like them.
For γ ∈ (0,1] agent utility strictly decreases as the agent moves away from a
50 − 50 neighborhood.
We use these utility functions as benchmarks, to compare with our results
presented in section 5, when we combine the Schelling game with the repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Initially, agents are randomly distributed on the lattice. Then an agent is
selected in turn, and the agent’s utility is calculated.7 Next a randomly open
spot is chosen. The agent then compares her utility from the new spot (as
6In addition, wrapping or not wrapping edges has been shown not to be crucial to the
emergence of segregation in the Schelling model (Pancs and Vriend, 2007).
7Since agents are randomly placed on the board, when we say that agents are selected
“in turn,” we mean that we begin with “agent 1” who could be located anywhere, then
8 







Figure 1: Diﬀerent utility functions for an agent’s prefence for integration.
if she was living there). If the utility of the new spot is greater than the old
spot, she moves, otherwise she stays. We repeat this process for each agent in
the model. Each “run” of game goes until 100,000 iterations or when agents
stop moving, whichever comes ﬁrst.8
In Schelling’s (1971) model, agents are initially placed in a perfectly in-
tegrated neighborhood. Some agents are then randomly “removed.” The
remaining agents determine if they are satisﬁed by looking at the propor-
tion of neighbors who are like them; if the proportion of like-typed agents
is below a certain threshold (e.g., 50%) they are put on a list of dissatis-
ﬁed agents (here we call this threshold the “Schelling threshold”). When
the agent’s “turn” comes up he moves to the nearest available satisfactory
position. The process then continues till no agent wants to move; in the end,
the board is typically highly segregated. As is now well-known, the ability of
agents to leave neighborhoods when they are not satisﬁed with the propor-
tion of agents like them causes a “tipping” dynamic that generates a highly
segregated outcome.
For this section, we use two measures of segregation: Similarity and
we go to “agent 2,” who could be anywhere, then on to “agent 3,” etc. Then we repeat
this process starting with “agent 1.”
8A run going for 100,000 iterations means that agents have up to 790 opportunities to
move. A run going for this many observations is quite rare. Furthermore, if no agents
move in a round, that does not mean they would not move in future rounds, but we end
the game at that point because it is suﬃciently close to being an equilibrium.
9Homogeneity.9 We deﬁne Similarity as the average proportion of same-type
neighbors for each agent across all neighborhoods. We deﬁne Homogeneity
as the average fraction of agents that live in neighborhoods that are all of
t h es a m et y p e . 10 Denote the agent type as t. L e tt h ea g e n to fo n et y p eb e
t =0 ;and an agent of the other type be t =1 , then we have the following













|1 − ti − tij|
#
,
where ti is agent i’s type and tij,j =1 ,...,ni, are the types of agent i’s
neighbors; N is the total number of agents. Thus si is the proportion of









1, if si =1
0, otherwise
¾
We repeat this version of the Schelling model experiment 200 times and
take averages over the runs. Figures below give examples of typical runs for
four values of γ to demonstrate how the utility functions can aﬀect segrega-
tion. We can see that γ directly aﬀects the equilibrium level of segregation.
T h ew h i t es q u a r e sa r et y p e0a g e n t s ,t h eb l a c ks q u a r e sa r et y p e1a g e n t s ,
and the gray squares are empty.
9Our measures of segregation produce qualitatively similar results as other measures
commonly used in empirical studies such as the Dissimilarity Index (Duncan and Duncan
1955). Also note that most of these commonly used measures are not amenable to our
population. For instance the dissimilarity index is sensitive to neighborhood size. If one is
working with a city population in the thousands or hundred-thousands with hundreds or
thousands of neighborhoods (as is common in many large cities) the sensitivity is reduced.
However the dissimilarity index would be sensitive to the choice of neighborhood size for
the population size used here.
10Schelling (1971) refers to these two measures as the “Share,” and the “Getto rate,”
respectively.
10γ =0 γ = .3
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Even when γ =1 , we can still get neighborhood clusters of like type (as
indicated by the patch of blocks of the same type), but globally speaking, on
average each agent has half of her neighbors of a diﬀerent type; and, few, in
any, agents live in a completely segregated neighborhood. Table 1 presents
the results; ﬁgure 2 presents the results graphically.
























Measures of Segregation for Schelling Game with Utility
Figure 2: % Similarity and % Homogeneity for diﬀerent utility functions.
The table illustrates a few facts. Segregation is monotonically decreasing
in γ, as would be expected. Notice that when γ =0 , over one-half of the
agents have all of their neighbors being of the same type, on average. Further,
on average, 85.5% percent of neighbors are of the same type.
Note that the γ =1case produces results very similar to perfect integra-
tion, a 50−50 neighborhood with no agents living in a purely homogeneous
neighborhood. As we decrease γ the model produces increasing levels of
segregation along both of the measures that we consider.
In addition, we have run a series of comparison tests. First, we ran the
model with no utility function and having agents move to a randomly chosen
open spot, if they had less than 1/3 like neighbors; we then repeated this,
but with the threshold equal to 1/2. I na d d i t i o n ,w er a nt h em o d e lw h e r e
agents compare the utility of their current location to that of a new location,
where the utility function is given by
u(s)=
½









This is the similar to the standard Schelling rule, but with a utility com-
parison added. Finally, we also included the average value of the Similarity
and Homogeneity measures for 200 randomly generated initial boards. The
results of these exercises are shown in Table 2.
The table illustrates that our baseline utility function (γ =0 )produces
about the same segregation as the two cases where the threshold is 1/2.
Changing the threshold from 1/2 to 1/3 generally reduces segregation since
12t h e r ea r em o r en e i g h b o r h o o d st h a tw i l lb ea c c e p t a b l et oa g e n t s . H a v i n g
the threshold at 1/3 is about the same as having γ equal to 0.3 or 0.4.
Interestingly, having agents make the utility comparison appears to reduce
segregation by a small amount.
Lastly, the Random Board outcome is roughly the same as the γ =1
outcome. Also note that in the γ =1case, agent movement will generally
stop before 100,000 iterations; meaning that the results of γ =1are not due
simply to the fact that agents are constantly on the move.11





Utility eq. (1), s<1
3 71.5 25.4
Utility eq. (1), s<1
2 84.5 51.4
Random Board 49.6 2.1
Table 2: Comparison tests for the Schelling model.
4 Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Putting aside the Schelling framework for a moment, we now turn to a re-
peated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD) game. As is standard for the PD game,
agents choose to play one of two actions: Cooperate or Defect. The general
payoﬀs of the game are given in table 3.
Rival Cooperate Rival Defect
Agent Cooperate A B
Agent Defect C D
Table 3: Prisoner Dilemma payoﬀs for an agent, when C>A>D>B .
11For all utility functions, movement stops, on average, after 16,203 iterations. We have
not found a strong relationship between the value of γ and the average number of iterations
until no movement occurs.
13As is well known, a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma has only one Nash equi-
librium: {Defect, Defect}. However, as is also well known, in a RPD game
when the game will not end with certainty, the folk theorem says that any
outcome in a RPD is a sustainable equilibrium given appropriate discount
values. As mentioned in the introduction there is now a large literature be-
yond the folk theorem on the maintenance of cooperation in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Here we use the basic framework of Nowack, Bonhoeﬀer and May
(1994) to install a RPD into the Schelling model. We note that this is just one
possible choice of many for incorporating a Prisoner’s Dilemma game that has
the possibility of resulting in cooperative outcomes. Although we will report
results on the outcome of the RPD game our primary focus is on the seg-
regation outcomes when this game is combined with the standard Schelling
model. Thus we restrict attention in this paper to our chosen implementa-
tion of the RPD and save additional comparisons to other implementations
for future work.
We begin with a stand alone version of the RPD in order to have a
benchmark for later comparison. In this paper we explore a game where each
round each agent plays a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game with each of their
neighbors. To simplify matters, we will set C = A+ε and D = B+μ, where,
μ,ε > 0, and we ﬁx A,B,a n dμ (μ is ﬁxed at a small value so as to preserve
the PD payoﬀ structure), and we change ε over diﬀerent experiments. By
changing ε we change the relative incentive to “cheat” in the RPD game. As
ε increases, agents have a greater incentive to defect against a cooperating
opponent; thus sustaining cooperation becomes less likely.
4.1 The RPD on the Lattice: The Model
In this paper, agents play with their neighbors, who as discussed above, are
within each agent’s “Moore” neighborhood. Each agent has a probability,
pi ∈ [0,1], of playing cooperate (and 1−pi is the agent’s probability of playing
defect). In this section, agents do not move.12 When an agent is selected, she
chooses an action {C,D} according to her probability distribution function.
Once an action is selected, she plays that same action with all her neighbors
12Note that agent movement can create diﬀerent outcomes if agents can compare PD
payoﬀs across locations. We do not address this type of movement here since it is not
directly relevant for the comparison with the combined game section below. Furthermore,
we also ﬁnd that if agents move to new locations at random, there is no qualitative
diﬀerence with the results presented here.
14for that round. She plays the PD with each neighbor, who selects an action
based on their own probability distribution function.
For any two players, deﬁne the payoﬀ to agent i when playing a neighbor
agent j as
πi (xi;xij)=Axixij+Bxi (1 − xij)+C (1 − xi)xij+D(1 − xi)(1− xij), (2)
where xi,x ij =1if a player cooperates; 0 if the player defects. xij represents
the action of agent i0s neighbor agent j ∈ {1,...,8}. If we set C = A+ε and
D = B + μ, and rearrange terms, equation (2) can be written as
πi (xi;xij)=Axij + B (1 − xij)+[ εxij + μ(1 − xij)](1 − xi).


















where ρij = 1
ni
Pni




. That is, agent i0s
average payoﬀ is determined by the proportion of neighbors playing cooper-




regardless of the agent’s action. However, if the agent chooses to defect, she





sum of the defection payoﬀs.
Each time an agent ﬁnishes playing with her neighbors we update her
pi.T ou p d a t epi we use the rule from Nowack, Bonhoeﬀer and May (1994),




j=1 πij (xij;xi)xij Pni
j=1 πij (xij;xi)
where xi,x ij =1 , if an agent cooperates, 0 otherwise. The rule is an imitation
rule where agents change their probability based on the strategies of their
neighbors. Note how this rule allows for the development of social capital
in that it implicitly allows for reciprocity: if a high proportion of neighbors
cooperate, then the agent will be more likely to cooperate the next time
the agent and her neighbors interact. Reciprocity has been found to be a
common behavior in economic activities (Fehr and Gächter, 2000).
15Thus, as “cooperate” (“defect”) becomes a more lucrative action for the
neighbors of agent i, pi increases (decreases). Also note that if all of an
agent’s neighbors play cooperate (defect) then the agent will play cooperate
(defect) in the next round with probability 1. Thus the system reaches an
absorbing state whenever all agents play the same action in a given round.
This formula can be rewritten according to equation (3) as
pi =
[Axi + B (1 − xi)]ρij




Notice that, cet. par, ∂pi/∂ρij > 0, which means that an increasing
level of cooperation in the neighborhood of agent i increases the probability
that agent i will cooperate in the next round. This can generate a type
of “cooperative tipping.” As demonstrated below, if ε is not too large, all
agents having pi =1can become an equilibrium (absorbing state).
4.1.1 Equilibria
For the probability updating rule given by equation (4), there are two pure
strategy equilibria (everyone plays cooperate or everyone plays defect) and
no mixed strategy equilibrium.
Claim 1 T h e r ea r et w op u r es t r a t e g ya b s o r b i n gs t a t e so ft h em o d e l ,pi =1
for all i and pi =0for all i, and no mixed strategy absorbing states.
Proof. To prove this, we begin with identifying the value of ρij where































εB =0 . (5)
Assuming A/B 6= ε/μ, then the only solutions to equation (5) are ρij =1
and ρij =0 , ∀i.
Next we turn to the selection of these equilibria over repeated plays.
164.2 The RPD on the Lattice: Experiments
Here, we ﬁx the payoﬀs (given in Table 4) and vary ε ∈ {0,0.01,0.02,...,0.10}.
Given the probability updating rule, there is a range of ε and μ where every-
one cooperating is an attainable absorbing state (where “attainable” here
means that it occurs with non-zero probability over repeated runs of the
RPD game). Notice, there are an inﬁnite number of payoﬀ values that can
be used, but, εand μ must be relatively small. We leave for further research
a more detailed exploration of the relationship between cooperation and the
payoﬀ space.
Rival Cooperate Rival Defect
Agent Cooperate 5 3
Agent Defect 5+ε 3.01
Table 4: Payoﬀsf o rR P De x p e r i m e n t .
To perform the experiment, we assign half the agents an initial probability
of 1 and the other half a probability of 0.13 As discussed above, each agent is
chosen in turn, and he randomly picks an action according to his probability
function. He then plays all his neighbors, who also randomly pick an action.
Note the agent selects an action once and plays the same action for that
round. After he plays the game with all his neighbors, he observes his rivals’
payoﬀs and updates his probability, pi. We run the system for 100,000 itera-
tions or until the system reaches an absorbing state, which ever comes ﬁrst.14
We then take averages of 200 runs to smooth out ﬂuctuations. The ﬁgures
below give illustrations of two runs where C =5 .05. The ﬁgures present, for
each iteration, the average of all agents’ probability of cooperation.
C =5 .05, Avg. Probabilities






Avg . Prob . of Coop .






Avg . Prob . of Coop .
13We have checked other initial conditions such as pi =1 /2 for all i, and other similar
initial distributions, and have found that the results to be qualitatively similar.
14Note that the system running for 100,000 iterations is statistically rare, occurring
roughly 5% or less across C payoﬀs.
17Table 5 presents the results; Figure 3 presents the results graphically. The
results presented are the proportion of runs (out of 200) that end in the game
hitting an absorbing state of all agents playing defect with probability one.
As the results show, the smaller the value of ε (the smaller the value of the
“cheat” payoﬀ, C), the smaller the proportion of runs that end in all agents
defecting; the remaining runs end with all agents cooperating. As shown in
the table, cooperation can be attained in a large percentage of runs as long
as the incentives to cheat are suﬃciently small.












Table 5: Percentage of RPD games that end in all agents defecting with
probability 1.
5 Combined Schelling and PD games
After having demonstrated the results in the stand-alone Schelling model
and our implementation of the RPD we now move to analyzing the combined
game. Recall that the purpose of this section of the paper is to analyze the
eﬀect of non-type based social interactions in a Schelling model. Here we are
modeling the additional social interactions as a RPD game with neighbors
as deﬁned in the Schelling model.
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Figure 3: Percentage of RPD games that end in all-defect (over 200 runs).
where x =1if an agent cooperates, and x =0if an agent defects; ρ is the
proportion of neighbors who cooperate. φ scales the relative importance of
the Schelling portion of utility to the RPD portion of utility. As φ increases
the importance of the Schelling game increases. Notice a few simplifying
assumptions that we make. First the utility function is simply the sum
of two game payoﬀs; there is no interaction eﬀect between the two parts.
Certainly we could imagine a situation where the payoﬀ to the Prisoner’s
Dilemma would be determined, in part, by the number of like-type agents;
and perhaps cooperation could be more likely if an agent is playing with
mostly her own type as in the signalling examples of cooperation in the RPD
mentioned in the introduction. In addition there is no asymmetry in utility
across types. We leave these complicating variations for future work.
As in the original Schelling model, we will deﬁne a threshold utility above
which agents are satisﬁed and remain at their current location; agents whose
utility is below the threshold are not satisﬁed and subsequently move. In this
implementation we set the Schelling portion of utility to be negative and the
RPD portion of utility to be positive and set the threshold at 0. Thus agents
need to have suﬃciently positive RPD utility in order to be satisﬁed. Further,
we can use φ to scale the importance of the two components of the utility
function. One also can think of changes to φ as an indirect adjustment of
the move threshold. As we increase φ we increase the weight on the negative
portion of utility and thereby increase the movement threshold indirectly.
As φ increases, either agents need to achieve larger RPD payoﬀs or live in a
19neighborhood with more like typed agents in order to be satisﬁed.
This general framework means that agents gain utility by moving to neigh-
borhoods with higher concentrations of their type (here we ﬁx γ =0 ), and/or
by learning to cooperate or defect depending on the actions of their neigh-
bors. We show here that tradeoﬀs exist between the two portions of utility:
a high cooperating neighborhood can oﬀset living in a neighborhood with
few of an agent’s same type. Recall that for the Schelling game we use the
following utility function (assume γ =0 ):
u(s)=α +2( β − α)s, if s ∈ [0,.5)
= β, if s ∈ [.5,1].
T om a k et h eu t i l i t yf r o mt h et w og a m e sd i r e c t l yc o m p a r a b l e ,w es e tα
and β equal to minus the RPD payoﬀs, −A and −B, respectively, and scale
the Schelling utility according to the parameter φ:
u(s)=−φ[A +2( B − A)s] if s ∈ [0,.5) (7)
= −φB, if s ∈ [.5,1] (assume γ =0 ),
where φ > 0 is the relative weight given to u(s) in the combined utility
function.
5.1 Combined Utility
If we substitute the Schelling utility and the RPD payoﬀ function into equa-
tion (6), and rearrange terms, we can write the combined utility function as
(with subscripts dropped)
U(s,x;φ)=( A − B)ρ + A(1 − φ)+( A − B)(φ2s − 1) + [ερ + μ(1 − ρ)](1 − x) if s ∈ [0,.5)
=( A − B)ρ + B (1 − φ)+[ ερ + μ(1 − ρ)](1 − x),i f s ∈ [.5,1].
Here combined (total) utility may be positive or negative depending on
the values of ρ, s,a n dφ. First, consider the case where s ∈ [0,.5).T h e
ﬁrst and last terms are clearly positive, while the middle two terms can be
positive or negative depending on the size of φ. Below we trace through the
various elements of the utility function more carefully in order to illuminate
the computational results that follow.
205.1.1 The Case of φ =1
For a moment, suppose that each of the two components of utility have equal
weight, this is the case when φ =1 . Therefore we have
U(s,x;φ)=( A − B)ρ +( A − B)(2s − 1) + [ερ + μ(1 − ρ)](1 − x) if s ∈ [0,.5)
=( A − B)ρ +[ ερ + μ(1 − ρ)](1 − x), if s ∈ [.5,1].
Recall that if an agent cooperates then x =1a n di fa na g e n td e f e c t st h e n
x =0 . Consider the case when s>0.5. In this case the Schelling utility
is a constant and only the level of ρ and the agent’s action (cooperate or
defect) determine utility. In the case where φ =1and s>1/2 the agent
always has positive utility and will not move regardless of the of outcome of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with her neighbors.
Now, consider the case where an agent cooperates (x =1 )a n dw eh a v e
s<0.5. In this case, the utility function is given by (A − B)ρ +( A −
B)(2s − 1). Therefore utility will be positive and an agent will not move if
(A−B)(ρ+2s−1) > 0. This implies that the agent needs ρ+2s>1 in order
to be satisﬁed. Note that there is a substitution eﬀect between the amount
of cooperation in the neighborhood and the fraction of like-typed neighbors.
High levels of cooperation can induce an agent to remain in a neighborhood
in which she is a minority member. Further, if ρ =1then any level of s
will yield utility greater than or equal to 0. In this case the agent will not
move. In sum, when φ =1 , the all-cooperate absorbing state makes an agent
satisﬁed even if he is a very small minority in his neighborhood.
Now, if the agent defects (x =0 )a n ds<0.5, then the agent receives an
added utility bonus of ερ + μ(1 − ρ). Thus a defecting agent is more likely
to have positive utility and stay than a cooperating agent, but the tradeoﬀ
between cooperation and like-typed agents still exists. Agents will stay in
a non-cooperating neighborhood if they have suﬃcient like-typed neighbors
and agents will stay in a neighborhood that has few like typed-neighbors if
there is suﬃcient cooperation.
Notice however that the dynamics of this process are complex. Even
though there exists a tradeoﬀ between cooperation and having suﬃcient like
typed neighbors, a neighborhood with high levels of cooperation is attractive
to defecting agents. A defecting agent in a highly cooperative neighborhood
will receive large payoﬀs and thus lead to other agents becoming more likely
to defect themselves. This would lead to agents wanting to move to neigh-
21b o r h o o d sw i t hm o r el i k e - t y p e dn e i g h b o r s .I nt h er e m a i n d e ro ft h i sp a p e rw e
will investigate the equilibrium conditions and the dynamics of this process.
5.1.2 Equilibria when φ =1
We proceed to discuss an equilibrium of the combined game when φ =1 .A n
equilibrium requires that (1) the RPD component of the game has reached
an absorbing state, and (2) all agents in the population have utility greater
than or equal to 0 so that no agent changes location. Above, we sketched the
requirements for agents not to move. We can now state these requirements
a bit more formally as functions of s and ρ for a cooperating and a defecting
agent in a combined game equilibrium.
In an equilibrium where all agents cooperate, x = ρ =1for each agent.
Recall that when x =1 , for no movement to occur we need ρ+2s>1 when
φ =1 .S i n c e ρ =1in equilibrium, this inequality always holds in an all
cooperate equilibrium. This means that an agent will accept any level of
integration or segregation at this equilibrium. But the level of segregation
that emerges will be a result of the complex, stochastic dynamics that unfold.
On the other hand, if we have the all-defect equilibrium then x = ρ =0.






, since this is the
value of s for which utility is greater than or equal to zero. Since D>B ,this
threshold will be achieved when s is close to, but less than, s =1 /2. That is
to say, even in the case where everyone defects, less segregation than in the
“pure” Schelling case is possible. Notice that if D were to be increased, it
would allow an even lower level of segregation to exist. Interestingly, as will
be discussed below, we ﬁnd in the simulation results, then when all agents
are in the all-defect absorbing state, the average level of segregation is higher
than in the “pure” Schelling game, without the RPD game; this is due do
what occurs “out of equilibrium.”
If we compare this to the equilibrium with all agents cooperating we see
that an equilibrium where all agents defect requires a suﬃcient level of like-
typed neighbors. The all-cooperate equilibrium can be sustained for any
level of s. If we think about these equilibrium outcomes in the spirit of
Schelling’s original model we see that an equilibrium with all-defect being
the RPD outcome implies that there will be a non-zero threshold for like-
typed neighbors for each agent. Thus we are in a situation very similar to the
original Schelling model and should expect high levels of segregation as in the
original model. On the other hand, if we reach an all-cooperate absorbing
22state of the RPD then this threshold for like-typed neighbors is removed
thereby creating the possibility of integration in the Schelling model.
This leads to several questions: (1) Under what conditions can we reach
the all-cooperate absorbing state in the combined game; just because an
equilibrium exists, does not mean that we can attain it? (2) If we reach
the all-cooperate absorbing state, what level of segregation will be attained?
Recall that the all-cooperate absorbing state can co-exist with any level of
segregation when φ =1 . Integration is possible but segregation is possible
as well.
We next describe the equilibrium conditions for the more general model
(we allow for φ 6=1 ) and then proceed to explore the parameter space of our
model using simulations.
5.2 The General Case
We now move to the general case with φ > 0. Recall that an agent’s utility
function is:
U(s,x;φ)=( A − B)ρ +( A − B)(φ2s − 1) + A(1 − φ)+[ ερ + μ(1 − ρ)](1 − x) if s ∈ [0,.5)
=( A − B)ρ + B (1 − φ)+[ ερ + μ(1 − ρ)](1 − x) if s ∈ [.5,1].
Given whether the game is in an all-cooperate or all-defect state, we can
s o l v ef o rt h el e v e l so fs as a function of φ and the PD payoﬀst h a tw i l lc r e a t e
positive utility and thus give agents the desire to stay. We call this level of
s the Implied Schelling Threshold of the combined game:
Deﬁnition: T h eI m p l i e dS c h e l l i n gT h r e s h o l d ,s∗, is the minimum level
of like-typed neighbors that can support a given equilibrium of the RPD game
(all-cooperate or all-defect) in the combined game.
One should think of s∗ as creating the same eﬀe c ta st h et h r e s h o l di nt h e
original Schelling model. A larger threshold should produce more segregation
than a smaller threshold. As we will see below s∗ will be very important in
understanding the outcomes of the model.










0 if φ ∈ (0,1]
)
. (8)
In short, for φ ∈ (0,1], any level of liked-typed neighbors can be sup-





, the ability to sustain
23integration will depend on both the value of A
B and how close φ is to it. Thus
there is a non-zero Implied Schelling Threshold level of like-typed neighbors
that must occur to support the all cooperate equilibrium for φ ∈ (1, A
B].B u t
for φ < 1,s ∗ =0 , i.e., there is no threshold. Note that this meets with
intuition; as φ increases the Schelling game becomes more important and we
should expect a “Schelling-style” threshold to emerge as φ increases. Also
note that for φ > A
B, no all-cooperate equilibrium exists since utility is always
less than 0 for all levels of s.

















Note that s∗ =0at φ = D
A.T h u sa tt h i sl e v e lo fφ and below any level
of like-typed neighbors can be supported in an all defect equilibrium. The
threshold increases as φ increases up to φ = D
B where s∗ =1 /2.A l s o n o t e





, is just the range for φ which preserves the
structure of the Schelling and PD games. No all-defect equilibrium exists for
φ > D
B since utility is always less than 0 for all levels of s.
If we compare s∗ in the all-cooperate equilibrium to s∗ in the all-defect
equilibrium, we see that a lower φ is required in the all-defect equilibrium to
have s∗ =0 . This implies that there must be less weight on the Schelling por-
tion of utility in an all-defect equilibrium in order to remove the threshold.
This leads one to believe that in order to achieve integration there has to be
a smaller weighting on the Schelling portion of utility in an all-defect equi-
librium than in an all-cooperate equilibrium. We can also directly compare
s∗ for the entire range of feasible levels of φ.
Claim 2 (1) The Implied Schelling Threshold, s∗,i se q u a lt o0 for φ ≤ D
A
in both the all-cooperate equilibrium and the all-defect equilibrium.
(2) The Implied Schelling Threshold, s∗, is lower in an all-cooperate equi-
l i b r i u mt h a ni na na l l - d e f e c te q u i l i b r i u mf o rφ ∈ (D
A, A
B).
Proof. (1) is shown directly in equations (8) and (9) above. For (2) we
need to consider two ranges of φ.F o rφ ∈ (D
A,1], s∗ =0in an all-cooperate
equilibrium and s∗ =
Aφ−D
2φ(A−B) > 0 for an all defect equilibrium. For φ ∈ (1, A
B)
we have s∗ =
Aφ−A
2φ(A−B) for the all-cooperate equilibrium and s∗ =
Aφ−D
2φ(A−B) for
the all defect equilibrium. Now, Aφ − A<A φ − D since A>D .T h u st h e
24Schelling threshold is strictly lower in the all-cooperate equilibrium over this
range of φ.
This claim states that s∗ in an all-cooperate equilibrium is less than or
equal to s∗ in an all-defect equilibrium for all levels of φ. Thus we should ex-
pect lower levels of segregation when an all-cooperate equilibrium is reached
compared to when an all-defect equilibrium is reached.
5.3 Combined Game Results
We now present simulation results of the combined game. All results are av-
erages over 1000 runs of the simulations for each value of C. To review, agents
are randomly distributed over the lattice; one-half of the agents are type 0;
the other one-half are type 1. Initially, one-half of the agents play cooperate
with probability zero; the other one-half play cooperate with probability 1.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game payoﬀsa r eﬁxed according to Table 4 (note
ε is a parameter that we change over diﬀerent simulations). We use the our
base utility function for the Schelling part, with γ =0 .
Each agent is selected in turn, and the agent plays the Prisoner’s Dilemma
with her neighbors according to her probability distribution function. The
neighbors also choose an action according to their probability distribution
functions. After the agent plays with her neighbors, her average payoﬀ is
determined. Next, the agent determines her “Schelling utility,” given by
equation 7. Then total utility is determined. If total utility is less than zero,
the agent moves to a randomly chose open spot. The game continues until
an absorbing state is reached in the RPD and all agents have utility greater
than or equal to 0 (thus no agent wishes to move.)
5.3.1 Cooperation and Similarity versus the Cheating Payoﬀ
Figure 4 demonstrates the relationship between cooperation and segregation
as we increase C,t h ep a y o ﬀ to “cheating,” when φ =1 .H e r ew es e et h a ta s
we increase C, there is a corresponding increase in the level of defection as
occurred in the stand-alone RPD game. In addition we see that segregation
also increases, on average, as C increases. Thus we see a ﬁrst indication of a
direct relationship between segregation and defection.
The reason that Similarity and defection move in the same direction is
b e c a u s ea sw ei n c r e a s eC there are relatively fewer games that end in everyone








































Figure 4: % Defection and % Similarity versus C Payoﬀ in Combined Game,
φ =1 .
























Figure 5: % Similarity for All-coopering and All-defecting outcomes, φ =1 .
Figure 5 shows that games that end in all-cooperation have consistently
lower similarity values than when the game ends in all players defecting.
Notice, however, that as we increase C, the all-cooperate case becomes in-
creasing rare, and therefore there is more variation in the Similarity measure.
In sum, as we increase the temptation to cheat, if the players do in fact learn
to cooperate, then they are also willing to live with relatively more agents of
the other type.
26As mentioned above, as C increases it becomes increasingly rare for the
agents to coordinate on the all-cooperate outcome. Also recall that the model
begins with one-half of the agents playing cooperate and one-half of the
a g e n t sp l a y i n gd e f e c t ;t h eg a m ei ss t a r t i n gi nt h em i d d l eo ft h es t a t es p a c e
on average. With large cheat payoﬀst h e r ea r el a r g ei n c e n t i v e st om o v et o -
ward the all-defect absorbing state. Thus one can imagine that in order to
move to the all-cooperate absorbing state the system must get there rela-
tively quickly because of the large incentives to move toward defection. This
is what we observe in our simulations. As C increases the runs that converge
to all-cooperate get there more quickly than when C is small.15 If we com-
bine this with the fact that agents begin in an integrated state we can see
why lower levels of similarity, or more integration, emerges as C increases
for the runs that end in all cooperate. If C i sl a r g ea n dt h ea g e n t sc o n -
verge to the all-cooperate outcome they must do so quickly and thus they
have relatively little time for segregation to develop. Thus, the relationship
shown in Figure 7 is largely due to the convergence properties of our prob-
ability adjustment rule combined with a lower Implied Schelling Threshold.
Diﬀerent probability-updating rules may not generate the same convergence
properties and therefore the same outcome. Nonetheless, what the rule does
demonstrate is that the faster the agents learn to cooperate the lower the
over-all segregation.
In addition, we can compare the level of segregation attained here to
the level of segregation attained in our stand-alone Schelling model when
γ =0 . In the stand-alone model, Similarity is equal to 85.5% for γ =0 .T h e
combined game results in lower levels of similarity (or segregation) for all
levels of C when the combined game reaches an all-cooperate absorbing state
compared to the stand-alone model. But, if the game reaches an all-defect
absorbing state, then the combined game model has a slightly larger level
of Similarity (segregation) compared to the stand-alone model. Thus social
interactions can have a positive eﬀe c ta n dr e d u c es e g r e g a t i o ni ft h es o c i a l
interactions result in cooperative outcomes. But social interactions can lead
to even worse levels of segregation if the interactions lead to non-cooperative
outcomes.
15For brevity, we do not present the results of convergence rates versus C;t h e ya r e
available upon request.
27Cooperation and Similarity versus φ Next we compare changes in seg-
regation and defection rates as we increase φ.A s φ increases more weight
is placed on the Schelling portion of utility. Thus one should expect more
segregation as compared to the original Schelling model due to the increase
in weight placed on the type-based portion of utility. As shown in Figure 6
this is exactly what we ﬁnd: an increase in φ leads to more segregation. The
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Figure 6: % Similarity versus C payoﬀ for three diﬀerent values of φ.
Further, as we saw in Section 5.2, the implied Schelling threshold of the
combined game is increasing in φ. And as shown earlier in the paper, there is
a direct relationship between segregation and defection. Again we see results
that match expectations.17
Figure 7 shows the relationship between similarity and the C payoﬀ for
the three diﬀerent values of φ when the game ends in the all-cooperate equi-
librium. In general, we see that a larger C value is associated with a lower
Similarity value, and that increasing φ increases the similarity index.
16Note we limit φ to a value less than but close to D/B =1 .00333; this is the largest
value for φ for which both the all-cooperate and all-defect equilibria exist.
17Interestingly, the relationship between φ and defection appears to be relatively weak.
For φ > 1, defection rates are slightly above those for φ ≤ 1, for all values of C. We do












Figure 7: % Similarity versus C payoﬀ for three diﬀerent values of φ, when
t h eg a m ee n d si na l l - c o o p e r a t e .
5.4 Utility and Welfare
Given our deﬁnition of utility we can investigate which outcomes provide the
greatest total utility or welfare for all the agents in the population, where







[πi (x;ρ) − φui (s)].
In equilibrium, the largest payoﬀ an agent can receive will come if she is
in the majority type in the neighborhood (she will get −φB) and if everyone
is cooperating (she gets A). Thus to make comparisons across games we








Note that this function only measures the welfare to agents in the game, but
does note include any external costs or beneﬁts that may accrue to society.
On average, as C increases, welfare will decline, since a larger fraction
of games end in all defect. Because of the plateau in the Schelling utility
function, agents will be indiﬀerent between any neighborhoods where the
fraction of like-type agents is greater than or equal to 0.5. In all cases of
the combined game discussed here, all equilibria that emerge have agents,
on average, living in neighborhoods that have more than half the agents like
29themselves, thus the increasing proportion of games that end in all-defect is














Figure 8: Welfare versus C payoﬀ for diﬀerent values of φ.
Furthermore, the ﬁg u r es h o w st h a ta sw ed e c r e a s eφ, we increase the
total welfare available to agents, because when the game ends in the all-
defect outcome, a smaller value of φ increases welfare. Reducing φ yields
both a cost and beneﬁt to total welfare. First, it increases the denominator
and thus reduces welfare. But reducing φ also lowers the Schelling part of
total utility. However, because segregation is higher (and virtually all agents
will be on the plateau part of the Schelling utility function) in the all-defect
case, lowering φ increases the numerator more than the denominator, and
thus welfare rises.
However a diﬀerent story occurs in the all-cooperate outcome. When we
reduce φ, welfare decreases. However, reducing φ also lowers segregation,
which reduces total welfare. In the end, a lower φ causes a net reduction in
total welfare. The relationship between φ and welfare is illustrated in Figure
9w h e r eC =5 .01.
However, when the game ends in all-cooperate, welfare is much higher
than when the game ends in all-defect. Figure 10 demonstrates how welfare
evolves versus the C payoﬀ,f o rt h ec a s ew h e nφ =1 . W es e et h a tw h e nt h e
games end in all cooperation, total welfare is roughly 95% of the maximum













































































Figure 9: Welfare versus φ,C=5 .01.
on average, a vast majority of the agents are in neighborhoods where they
a r ei nt h em a j o r i t y( a sF i g u r e5d e m o n s t r a t e s ) .
To give a numerical illustration, take the case where φ =1 , this gives a
denominator for equation (10) of 5 − 3=2 . Furthermore, let’s assume that
in equilibrium, 90% of the agents are in neighborhoods with at least 50%
like-type agents (which gives payoﬀ of −B = −3) and 10% of the agents are
in less-than-majority neighborhoods, and are getting −B=−4, on average.
Thus in the all-cooperating outcome, the numerator of equation (10) is 5 −
0.9(3) − 0.1(4) = 2.9. This gives total welfare of 2.9/3=0 .95. Now let’s
s a y ,t h eg a m ee n d si nt h ea l l - d e f e c to u t c o m et h i sg i v e sat o t a lw e l f a r eo f
(3 − 2.9)/2=0 .05. In short, the outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
is driving the total welfare.
5.4.1 Policy Implications
In summary, we can make the following conclusions about the model.
• The outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game can reduce segregation
because it can lower the “Schelling threshold,” especially in cases where
the all-cooperate outcome emerges.
• As C increases, when all agents cooperate, there is a reduction in the













Figure 10: Welfare vs. C payoﬀ, for all-cooperating and all-defecting out-
comes, φ =1 .
• However, given the PD game payoﬀsa n dt h eφ parameters used here,
there is never an outcome that yields full integration (where full inte-
gration is all agents living with exactly 50% of like types).
• As a result of this, total welfare to “society” is, in essence, aﬀected
by the outcome of the RPD game, with the all-cooperate outcome
generating roughly 95% of total possible welfare, while the all-defect
outcome generates roughly 5% of total possible welfare.
• Decreasing φ decreases segregation, and its eﬀect on total welfare de-
pends on whether the game ends in all-cooperate or all-defect.
These ﬁndings suggest that if there was a “social planner” she should
attempt to inﬂuence the game in the following manner. By attempting to
reduce φ, the planner would decrease segregation. This would be a “good”
outcome from a social point of view since, as described in the introduction, it
can increase the external beneﬁts to society from less segregation and it can
have a positive or only slightly negative eﬀect on agent welfare, as described
above. Secondly, the planner should encourage cooperation among agents, at
least in the early stages of the game to generate an all-cooperate equilibrium.
The all-cooperate equilibrium reduces segregation as well as improves agent
welfare.
32The next issue that arises is how do the policy suggestions given within
the context of the game translate into actual policy recommendations? φ
would translate into the relative taste for type-based preferences to the game
outcome. One can argue, as is discussed in Sethi and Somanathan (2004), for
example, that φ has been decreasing over time simply due to the evolution
of society and the global economy, as well as the evolution of educational
curricula that includes discussion of ethnic and racial diversity in the U.
S. In regards to moving agents to increasing neighborhood cooperation, a
policy prescription would be for state and/or local governments to create or
promote the creation of community-based organizations that facilitate trust
and cooperation among residents (Nyden, et al., 1997).
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has introduced non-typed based social interactions into the Schelling
model of residential segregation. In general we ﬁnd that social interactions
can help to dampen the forces within the Schelling model that lead to segre-
gation if the social interactions lead to a cooperative outcome. The ability to
produce cooperative social outcomes can help mitigate individual preferences
for like-typed neighborhoods. On the other hand, if social interactions lead
to non-cooperative outcomes, then levels of segregation are increased beyond
those found in the traditional Schelling model. In sum, non-cooperative so-
cial interactions lead to greater levels of segregation but cooperative social
interactions lead to integration. We have also demonstrated that integra-
tion and cooperation are obtainable and stable equilibria by showing how
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game can reduce the “Schelling Threshold,” i.e., the
proportion of like-type neighbors an agents needs to have, not to move, and
thus increase integration. We have also shown that as we increase the temp-
tation for players to play defect, when the game ends in an all-cooperate
outcome, we have increased levels of integration.
T h e r ea r em a n ypo s s i b l ee x t e n s i o n st ot h i sw o r k .F o re x a m p l e ,a g e n t sm a y
have heterogeneous utility functions both between types and more generally
within types. Agents may have heterogeneous numbers of neighbors or social
interactions, or the structure of social interactions may be more complex
than that studied here. Social interactions also may include other games or
processes than the RPD. The most fruitful extension may be to have agents
in the model recognize the type of their neighbors and react to that type
33in their social interactions. For instance, we could allow an agent’s strategy
to be a function of her opponent’s type as in the signaling RPD framework.
W ee x p e c tt h ed y n a m i c so fam o d e lo ft h i st y p et ob ec o m p l e xb u to fg r e a t
interest.
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